The Closing of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Plant: The Impact on a New England Community by Mullin, John R. & Kotval, Zenia
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Landscape Architecture & Regional Planning
Faculty Publication Series Landscape Architecture & Regional Planning
October 1997
The Closing of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power
Plant: The Impact on a New England Community
John R. Mullin
University of Massachusetts - Amherst, jmullin@provost.umass.edu
Zenia Kotval
Michigan State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/larp_faculty_pubs
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Landscape Architecture & Regional Planning at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Landscape Architecture & Regional Planning Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mullin, John R. and Kotval, Zenia, "The Closing of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Plant: The Impact on a New England
Community" (1997). Journal of the American Planning Association. 25.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/larp_faculty_pubs/25
THE CLOSING OF THE YANKEE ROWE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT  
 
The Impact on a New England Community  
America's nuclear power companies for the first time, face reduced demand and a resulting decline in 
generating capacity that will affect not only the industry, but also the communities that have become 
dependent on the "nuclear economy." Across the United States there are 111 nuclear plants; 
approximately twenty are expected to close by the year 2012 (Pasqualetti 1991a, Allen 1996.) While 
many Americans applaud this trend, the fact remains that the closings will bring extensive economic 
hardships to the communities and regions where the plants are located. This paper is a case study of 
the local effect from the closing of Yankee Atomic Electric Company's nuclear power plant in Rowe, 
Massachusetts. The authors conclude that decisions to close nuclear power plant are highly unlikely to 
consider the local impacts that may occur. The paper is intended as a start toward understanding how 
the closing of nuclear power plants affect local and regional economies, and considers the role that the 
federal and state governments can have in helping communities shift to an non-nuclear economic 
base.  
Until recently, the literature on decommissioning nuclear power plants has consisted almost 
exclusively of technical reports in trade journals with little interest to the general public. There is little 
public awareness of the approaching age of decommissioning and even less recognition that the 
process has already begun. Approximately 50 research (nongenerating) reactors have been 
dismantled, and 24 government and commercial power plants have been decommissioned. It is 
estimated that 72 reactors, totaling thousands of megawatts of generating capacity, will come due for 
decommissioning between 1992 and 2012. This process will, undeniably, need a trained workforce, 
waste depositories, funds, and careful local planning-little of which now exists (Pasqualetti 1991a; 
Allen 1996a).  
Nuclear policy has recently become more responsive to public attitudes and pressure. Special interest 
groups have often succeeded in influencing the siting and operations of nuclear power plants and 
dump sites. Notable examples of public influence include the injunction to shut down the Saxton 
Reactor, in Saxton, Pennsylvania, until 1997; making permanent the temporary shutdown at the 
Humboldt Plant, in Eureka, California; and achieving the dismantling of the Shoreham Plant, in New 
York, without its ever having operated at full power or generated the funds to pay for its own 
decommissioning. Other communities affected to varying degrees by public pressure concerning 
nuclear power plants include Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania; Indian Point, New York; Rancho Seco, 
California; Dresden, Illinois; Nine Mile Point, New York; and the locations of several Yankee Plants in 
New England (Pasqualetti 1990; Ballard et al. 1991; Pasqualetti and Pijawka 1996). It is also 
interesting to note that nuclear power plants are becoming pawns in local development strategies. For 
example, town officials in historic Plymouth, Massachusetts expect Boston Edison's Plymouth Nuclear 
Plant to close in the next decade; the closing will mean a loss of live to seven million dollars in property 
tax revenue, approximately 25 percent of the town's property tax base (Allen 1996b). A local developer 
has used the prospect of revenue loss as a key argument for being granted a permit to build a 
proposed mega development on a nearby site (Curran 199s).  
The thesis of this paper is that decisions to close nuclear power plants are likely to ignore the effects 
on their local communities. It is clear that, without assistance from government or the utility companies, 
such communities will then struggle economically for years and possibly decades. The paper 
contributes to the growing body of planning literature that addresses the responsibility large institutions 
or companies have toward their local communities when they close major installations. In many ways, 
communities where nuclear power plants close face the same kinds of issues as do those that lose 
military bases, mental hospitals, or tuberculosis hospitals. They are left with buildings and grounds that 
usually are aged, difficult to revitalize, failing to meet current standards for production layouts, and 
poorly located. In one way, however, the problems of reusing nuclear sites are uniquely difficult, for 
along with the aforementioned obstacles, a seemingly ineradicable stigma is attached to them. Simply 
stated, the site of a closed nuclear power plant, whether encased or dismantled, is unlikely to be 
selected for any active economic use. Other questions that arise concerning nuclear power plant 
closings and that have no clear cut answers are also examined here: the appropriate role for planners 
at various levels of government, and the issue of equity.  
The paper has three main sections. The first sets the theoretical framework for the case study; the 
second is a case study of the local effects from the closing of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company's 
(YAEC's) nuclear power plant in Rowe, Massachusetts. The final section explores the implications of 
the case study, with the hope that it will stimulate discussions of how the federal and state 
governments can or should assist communities who are struggling with the transition to a non-nuclear 
economic base.  
The Theoretical Framework  
The nuclear power industry is undergoing extensive changes. Reduced demand and changed 
attitudes toward nuclear energy are resulting in plant closings. Because of the changed attitudes 
concomitant with local economic conditions, institutional imperatives, and the local politics of plant 
closings, the local consequences of plant closings are being ignored. Three separate bodies of theory 
may shed some light on the politics of decommissioning; they are the theory of attitude formation 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Dear and Taylor 1982), the political dynamics of plant closings (Staudohar 
and Brown, eds. 1987; Portz 1988), and theories about the collapse of nuclear energy (Campbell 
1988; Morone and Woodhouse 1989; Pasqualetti 1990). This section briefly discusses these theories 
and highlights the lessons that are significant for the case study that follows.  
Theory of Attitude Formation  
The theory of attitude formation provides a framework for analyzing how community attitudes toward 
certain unwanted uses develop. The theory of reasoned action proposed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) 
assumes that social behavior is the product of a rational thought process. Attitudes are based on an 
individual's salient beliefs, which may have either personal or societal origins. The factors that shape 
beliefs are external to an individual's mental processes. They include variables of social and 
demographic status and also contextual factors.  
One outcome of attitudes is the degree of acceptance or rejection of a facility, which certainly played a 
role in the YAEC case history. Anxiety about nuclear disasters rose as community groups raised 
questions about the consequences of the nuclear facility's presence. Those attitudes led to the 
formation of a local action group in Franklin County who expressed their clear belief that the region 
should not have to bear the responsibilities and risks that the nuclear facility brought.  
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) argue that, with respect to a particular social behavior, an individual holds 
two types of beliefs: behavioral beliefs, which are generated by one's personal perceptions of the 
consequences of the behavior; and normative beliefs, which are shaped by social influences. 
Behavioral beliefs may arise from perceptions of, for example, the effects on personal safety, property 
values, noise levels, traffic volumes, or neighborhood character. Normative beliefs could originate as 
responses to authority and to societal concerns such as environmental safety.  
As nuclear technology comes to seem more complex and less accessible to the average person, 
normative beliefs take on an important role; people depend on the experts. Until the 1960s, the public 
perceptions of nuclear power tended to be positive: there was consensus among the experts, which 
reassured the public. In the 1970s, consensus began to break down. It became apparent from 
regulatory debates that the experts did not agree. When people couldn't understand the issues and the 
debates, and the experts disagreed, people sided with the experts who shared their views on those 
issues they did understand (Morone and Woodhouse 1989).  
The Political Dynamics of Plant Closings  
The dynamics in a plant closing are comparable to those in the decommissioning of a nuclear power 
plant, in that they involve government officials, regulatory agencies, special interest groups, and 
private business, as well as the other members of the community. Yet, although the process of 
adjustment remains similar, the politics of plant closings differ from those of nuclear decommissioning. 
Government interventions at the local, state, and national levels can shape the outcomes of plant 
closures and the subsequent adjustment. However, unlike traditional plant closings, nuclear 
decommissioning often entails contradictory public responses and requirements. In traditional plant 
closings, government interventions typically first try to avert the plant closing by providing financial 
assistance, infrastructure improvements, or other support, and then to alleviate the problems caused 
by the closing, through re-employment centers, retraining programs, and other assistance (Portz 
1990). But in the case of nuclear decommissioning, the politics of local government intervention are 
polarized, nondirective, and often superficial. In either case, furthermore, the degree of government 
involvement varies from minimal to active. Minimal adjustment aid is that dictated by the private sector 
with little or no input from the government or the community. Moderate government intervention is to 
act as a facilitator and provide resources to the private sector with the aim of bringing about a 
successful, mutually acceptable adjustment. Active government intervention shapes or imposes an 
adjustment process (Portz 1990).  
Although the literature and laws on plant closings deal mainly with whether and to what extent laws 
should protect affected workers and communities, several arguments for and against government 
involvement may apply to nuclear decommissioning as well. To date, federal legislation has simply 
required advance notice of plant closures and also worker adjustment and retraining efforts. When it 
comes to nuclear decommissioning, these requirements pose an interesting dilemma. Although the 
reasoning behind the advance notice requirement-averting economic and psychological distress and 
honoring corporations' social obligations-holds true as well for nuclear power plants, meeting this 
requirement is often unfeasible. Decommissioning decisions are rarely made by the company in a 
vacuum.  
Theories About the Collapse of Nuclear Energy  
The collapse of the nuclear energy industry is a classic example of the fate of socially unacceptable 
technology. The history of nuclear power can be attributed to technological inertia and to the blend of 
democratic debate and decision strategy necessary to shape and reshape technologies to match 
evolving social preferences (Morone and Woodhouse 1989). Civilian nuclear power in the United 
States has triggered widespread fear and disillusionment about its benefits. Some of this 
disenchantment can be explained by the ongoing lack of public involvement and information.  
In a process that Charles Lindblom defines as the "intelligence of democracy," policy achieves 
acceptability gradually as it undergoes a series of adjustments. The original policy is revised in small, 
reversible steps in response to feedback about errors, interpretations, and changing perceptions about 
needs and opportunities. The original decisions about nuclear energy and policy were made by a 
relatively small group without the widespread consultation and debate that often accompanies major 
decisions. Thus, by denying the public the right to question their plans, the proponents of nuclear 
power in industry and government damaged their credibility and enhanced the legitimacy and power of 
their critics (Bupp and Derian 1981). Furthermore, as the policy was formed, the structure of the 
regulatory apparatus on safety issues was closed to citizen input, but not to corporate input, so that the 
public saw the government to be favoring corporate interests over their own. The public's distrust and 
suspicion then led to deliberate confrontations at sites of nuclear power plants. (Campbell 1988).  
The policy favoring nuclear energy use has had both advocates and antagonists. Advocates point to 
France and Japan, which rely extensively on nuclear power. They assert that even accepted 
technologies such as pesticides, coal as fuel, and chemical plants are not fully compatible with 
environmental values, and that most have hurt more people every year than American nuclear power 
has done so far in its history. Antagonists, on the other hand, point to a long list of poorly managed 
plants, construction flaws, huge cost overruns, and a thoroughly muddled and biased regulatory 
system (Motone and Woodhouse 1989).  
Nuclear technology, however, seems more complex than other technologies, and less accessible to 
the average person. Well-publicized accidents and crises at operating reactors, coupled with 
revelations of shoddy construction, questionable operator training, and poor maintenance at some 
plants, clearly have moved the public toward increasing skepticism.  
Lessons Significant to the Case Study  
All three theories outlined here present lessons. One is that a continued effort to improve public 
awareness and information about nuclear safety and to recognize and accommodate legitimate 
community fears about nuclear facilities would help to create more positive attitudes among citizens. 
Another is that, in the simplest terms, nuclear decommissioning is akin to an industrial plant closing. 
However, the scale, expense, and time for a nuclear power plant decommissioning far exceed any 
ordinary plant closing's: the process is both extremely complex and seemingly endless. That is why it 
must be carried out with sensitivity and extra diligence.  
Case Study of the Decommissioning of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company Plant, Rowe, 
Massachusetts  
This plant began operating in 1960 and was closed in 1992. It is now undergoing the time-consuming 
process of decommissioning. The plant was one of the largest employers and taxpayers in Franklin 
County, the poorest county in Massachusetts. Today, although crews are still intermittently dismantling 
the facility, it sits quietly as a reminder of an increasingly questioned technology. Robert Weissman 
(1992) called the plant a "Nuclear Tombstone." This case study, it is hoped, will be a starting point for 
understanding how closing a nuclear power plant profoundly affects the regional economies.  
The Regional and Local Setting  
Most people consider Massachusetts to be a highly urbanized state. The mind's eye envisions the 
economically vibrant, highly populated, culturally rich, and historic cities of Boston, Lowell, or 
Worcester, or the high technology belt along Route 128. Fewer people are familiar with Western 
Massachusetts (around 100 miles west of Boston), with its rolling hills, blue-collar mill towns, strong 
agricultural base, and small, rural communities. The town of Rowe (population 357) is situated in this 
"Other Massachusetts" (Tree 1987) (map 1).  
Rowe is surrounded by the equally small towns of Charlemont, Heath, and Monroe, which form the 
western section of Franklin County, and the town of Florida, in eastern Berkshire County. Franklin 
County, rich in history, was renowned for its nineteenth century cutlery, tool making, and tap and die 
companies. Throughout the twentieth century, however, as settlers moved west, as tastes changed, 
and as world competition increased, the county slowly glided into a genteel poverty that still continues. 
Over the past decade, for example, large plants-the Bendix Corporation (electrical components), the 
Greenfield Tap and Die Company (tool making), the Deerfield Glycene Paper Company (glazed 
papers for mail envelopes), and the Merrilat Company (wood cabinets), among others-have closed or 
dramatically curtailed operations. The industrial base of Franklin County, though showing some signs 
of rebirth, is a shadow of its former self.  
The nearest major highway, State Route 2 (the Mohawk Trail), is eleven miles south of Rowe. From 
the Rowe exit, a driver would move along a narrow road with sharp turns, through the village of Zoar 
and the town of Charlemont. They are among the poorest communities in Massachusetts, and look it: 
scattered mobile homes, rural shacks, untilled farms, and abandoned automobiles can be seen from 
the road. But the town of Rowe presents an entirely different landscape. Well paved roads, first-class 
institutional buildings, carefully maintained housing units and municipal signs reflecting New England's 
historic character abound (Werth 1991). The civic amenities include even the town dump, which is a 
"landscaped refuse garden." Elizabeth Kolbert (1991) has labeled YAEC itself as "perhaps the most 
picturesque nuclear power plant in America" (illustration 1). Approximately seven percent of the adult 
residents of Rowe worked at the YAEC plant.  
Rowe has no town water or sewer facilities, one grade school, and three stores. As a relatively 
prosperous town, its roads, parks, town hall, and town garage are the envy of its neighbors. It is a quiet 
town with virtually no crime, no night life, and few formal activities for its young people. Indeed, the 
YAEC plant is located in such a sparsely populated area that of the 111 nuclear plants in the nation, 
the company would have had to evacuate the least number of residents in the case of a nuclear 
accident (Roche 1991a). As a nuclear scientist, Frank Wicks, noted, "YAEC has to be about the most 
obscure nuclear power plant in the United States" (Ackerman 1985).  
YAEC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
The main offices of the Yankee Atomic Electric Company are in Bolton, Massachusetts, one of 
Boston's outermost suburbs. This highly successful company, like many other nuclear power 
companies in the United States, has been a target for antinuclear activists. The protests increased 
dramatically in the early 1990s after the company had applied for an extension to its license to operate 
the Rowe plant, and appeared to be reinforced by the spillover from the highly effective Clam Shell 
Alliance protests against the Seabrook Nuclear Plant in New Hampshire. Local protesters' signs said 
"Death Rowe," "Hell no, we won't glow," and "Guinea Pigs Unite" (Wald 1991a). (See illustration 2.) 
Sophisticated protests by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a powerful advocacy group, against the 
continued use of the plant were frequent (Roche 1991b; Wald 1991c). Finally, with the exception of 
former United States Representative Silvio Conte, nuclear power rarely met with any degree of 
enthusiasm from the Commonwealth's various governors, its senators, or members of its 
congressional delegation. At best, the politicians simply wished the plant would quietly go away 
(Nyhan 1988; Blixt 1991).  
YAEC, despite the protests and the lack of political support, was proud of its Rowe plant as the 
nation's oldest commercial nuclear plant and one that was frequently cited as among the safest 
(Nuclear Power 1988; Dismantling of A Plant 1992). It was also one of the nation's smallest (200 
megawatts, one-fourth the size of the huge Shoreham nuclear facility) and most profitable facilities. it 
produced power 74 percent of the time, well above the industry average of 66 percent (Tye 1988). 
Then-President Bush called Rowe a "model for the future of nuclear power" (Wilke 1991a); I. C. Bupp, 
an energy consultant with the highly respected Cambridge Energy Research Associates, stated: "For 
all practical purposes, YAEC has been a perfect machine" (Kriz 1991). YAEC executives believed the 
plant could be modernized and operated safely for years to come. The company's official policy was 
that every meaningful inquiry about the safety and efficiency of the plant should be responded to as 
rationally as possible; its stated position was that public and political support were important to its goal 
of providing power as efficiently, cleanly, safely, and profitably as humanly possible (Strategic Planning 
1991).  
During the spring of 1991, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) began hearings in Washington, 
DC on the future of aging nuclear power plants. A major purpose of these sessions was to upgrade the 
NRC standards for safe operation. The Commission used YAEC as the test case in the deliberations 
because of its age and its reliability record, and because it was the first of many plants to seek twenty-
year extensions of their expiring forty-year operating licenses (Wilke 1991a). When the NRC adopted 
new standards for safe operation, however, they were more exacting than YAEC could meet and still 
make a profit (Gelbspan 1992). The company appealed to the NRC for less stringent controls. The 
NRC not only refused, but recommended that YAEC be closed in the near future (Wald 1991b). Faced 
with virtually no options, the company chose to comply immediately: On February 26, 1992, the plant 
was permanently closed. The immediate response to the closing was quite mixed. The local 
antinuclear activists were jubilant, but a little stunned at having their battle over. The local nuclear 
energy supporters were angry-with the government, the company, and the activists. They had never 
thought that the plant would close permanently.[ 1]  
YAEC's Economic Contributions to the Community[ 2]  
The image of most utilities is one of a corporate monolith staffed by faceless bureaucrats in three-
piece suits working in some distant city. YAEC achieved quite the opposite image. The company was 
well integrated into Franklin County and its communities. It operated on the premise that its workers, 
white- and blue-collar alike, should be involved citizens, that the company should take a leading role in 
public service, and that its success would be helped by creating a strong public-private partnership 
with surrounding communities. A skeptic might point out the advantage to the company of ingratiating 
itself with the community. After all, it is extremely difficult for citizens to become upset with or to protest 
against a company that is the leading contributor to local charities, that pays for a new town fire truck, 
and that funds extracurricular school activities. On the other hand, one could praise YAEC for following 
an enlightened set of corporate policies about its community responsibilities. It is our conclusion that 
Yankee was operating in both its own interest and that of the region and its communities.  
During the last full year of plant operations (1991), YAEC's payroll was approximately $12.5 million. In 
addition, it spent approximately $3.8 million on goods, services, and municipal taxes in Western 
Massachusetts, a region consisting of Berkshire, Franklin, Hampden, and Hampshire Counties (table 
1). Its employees, residing in twenty-one different cities and towns in the county, were relatively well 
paid. The executives, with an average annual salary of $55,000, were in the top 10 percent of all 
salaries in the county. The blue-collar, union work force of highly skilled technicians were paid an 
average of $33,690 annually, placing this group among the county's top salaries for blue-collar 
employees. The office staff, with an average annual wage of $25,900, earned approximately 25 
percent more than the average for this group in the county. These figures depict a relatively 
prosperous work force that was spending a significant share of its income on goods and services in 
Franklin County and the Western Massachusetts Region. With such salaries and wages, it is 
understandable that YAEC's annual turnover was less than 2 percent. The work force appeared stable, 
secure, and confident of its future.  
The company followed a policy of purchasing as much as it could in Franklin County. The range of 
purchases was quite broad. At one end, the company purchased high-cost consulting, marketing, 
medical, security, testing, and travel services. At the other end, retail "hard goods" were purchased 
from local building supply, department, furniture, and paper stores. In 1991, these purchases were 
spread among 125 small businesses in 12 communities across the county. A comparison of YAEC's 
purchasing policies with those of the small companies in the Western Massachusetts Region is 
revealing. While YAEC was buying its goods and services from small regional companies, these small 
firms tended to buy their goods from larger companies outside the region. In short, the larger company 
"bought local," but the small firms did not (Armstrong and Mullin 1987).  
The company rarely turned down requests for assistance from charities and public service 
organizations. At times its participation was minimal (e.g., a $25 donation to the local ballet company). 
At other times, YAEC's participation ensured that the United Way met its goals. In 1991, the company 
itself donated $17,000 to nonprofit service organizations, beyond the contributions of its workers. It 
was regularly among the largest single donors to charitable causes in Franklin County.  
The company's tax payments were substantial$696,000 in property taxes for 1991 in Rowe, and 
$14,000 in taxes to six other towns. The payment to Rowe was about 33 percent of all tax revenues. 
The town's ability to raise taxes is severely limited by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts' tax cap 
restriction, Proposition 2 1/2; moreover, the late 1980s and early 1990s brought severe recession and 
falling residential property values in the county. Thus, Yankee Rowe's taxes were critical to 
maintaining the town's superior services.  
To further explore the nuclear power plant's economic role in Rowe, we applied the United States 
Department of Commerce National Input/Output model to measure the flow of dollars resulting from 
and stimulated by YAEC. Adjusted for inflation, the results show that every $1.362 million of electric 
power sales contributed to creating 9.1317 jobs in the local economy. With $70 million of electric 
power produced in 1991, YAEC directly contributed to the creation of 469 jobs in Franklin County and 
nearby Hampshire County. To put it another way, every 1.8 jobs in the Yankee plant created another 
job in the local economy. For personal income the results are equally strong. Every $1.362 million of 
YAEC's electric power sales brought $193,600 into the economy of the two counties. With all factors 
combined, the company's annual contribution to total personal income for 1991 in two counties was 
$9,950,073 (table 2).  
In fall, 1991, YAEC made public all the economic contributions from YAEC described in this section, 
through a series of press releases and conferences.  
Five Years Later  
At the writing of this paper more than five years had passed since the closing of the plant was 
announced. This section examines the effects of that decision.  
Generally, there was a somewhat wistful feeling in Rowe that life just wasn't the same any more (Keller 
1992; Kelly and Valette 1992). This was not simply a dollars-and-cents matter of jobs, taxes, and the 
economic base, but rather a loss of the community's strong sense of purpose. It was as if its identity as 
a productive unit of society had blurred: it was no longer the home of the first, safest, highly productive 
American nuclear plant. Now it was the site of the first on-line nuclear plant in America to be closed 
under the NRC's new safety standards (Blixt 1993; Davis 1993c). A dubious honor! The former 
workers, who were professional, well paid, and loyal in their belief in nuclear power, the Yankee plant, 
and YAEC, clearly regretted no longer being affiliated with the challenging production of the "fuel of the 
future."  
As of January, 1994, 120 workers (46 percent of the work force) had left the plant. Many had moved to 
other nuclear power plants in distant states: Michigan, Arizona, Texas, Washington. Some had retired. 
Ten had found jobs at Yankee's Bolton headquarters. Others had opted to stay in the area and take 
their chances for employment. YAEC clearly had a policy of holding on to workers as long as it could. 
Nonetheless, all the workers who still worked at the plant knew there was no future for them with the 
company. Out of approximately 250 workers, 31 were laid off in September, 1996, to lessen Yankee 
Rowe's financial burden from having the decommissioning process held up by litigation (Yankee 
Atomic Announces Layoffs 1996). Nothing signified YAEC's end as dramatically as the loading of two 
of the company's four generators for shipment to the area in Barnwell, South Carolina for disposal of 
nuclear wastes. After being carried slowly through Rowe's winding hills, the generators were placed on 
flatbeds to go by rail to their final site (illustration 3). With lights blinking and klaxons piercing the hills, it 
was indeed a funeral procession marking the fact that life in Rowe would never be the same (Feinstein 
1993).  
The departure of many YAEC employees changed the everyday life of the community. YAEC had 
strongly supported civic activities by its employees, who by all accounts had been leaders in local 
affairs. They had judged science fairs, supervised playgrounds, coached Little League teams, and led 
Scout troops. They had been volunteer fire fighters, town selectpersons, and members of many local 
boards. Their talents, willingness to help, and "can do" attitude were now sorely missed.  
The town's retail businesses had suffered. The supermarket most used by Rowe residents had closed. 
A major undertaking in nearby Shelburne had failed to receive credit approval because the borrower's 
employment at YAEC was uncertain; a local resident had withdrawn his proposal to build a new 
restaurant (Valette 1992; Gordon 1993; Maloney 1993).  
The serious financial effects for the region from the plant closing were apparent. In 1994, YAEC paid 
about $200,000 in property taxes, which approximated 28 percent of what it had paid in 1991, and it 
expected to regularly request further abatements as the value of the plant declined. The revenue loss 
had directly affected town services. For example, the Town of Rowe and three neighboring towns had 
often consolidated funds to purchase an ambulance, and Rowe, by far the most affluent, had always 
paid the major part of the cost. In 1994, Rowe balked at paying 25 percent. YAEC had always 
contributed to such capital purchases as fire trucks, sanders, modular buildings, and civil defense 
equipment. Funding for these expenses now had to come from municipal tax revenues (Valette 
1993a).  
The effects of the plant closing can be most vividly seen in terms of schools. YAEC had been 
somewhat involved for years with the finances of the town of Monroe, whose town line lay just outside 
the site. In 1987, when Monroe lost its only major employer and was nearly bankrupt (Armstrong and 
Mullin 1989), YAEC had agreed to rent the town's former school, providing enough revenue to stabilize 
the town's tax base. In 1994, the loss of Yankee's revenues placed Monroe once more at the edge of 
bankruptcy, barely able to pay the tuition for its children to nearby schools (Mathews 1989). YAEC cut 
its contributions to a local fund that enabled all students in nearby communities to have a free lunch 
and a late bus; the parents and/or communities had to absorb those costs. Rowe's neighbor to the 
north, the small, impoverished town of Heath, faced an especially devastating change. For more than 
twenty-five years, Heath had sent its school children (K-6) to Rowe schools, with Rowe absorbing $0 
percent of the cost. Heath paid only $2,300 of the $4,600 actual per-pupil cost (1993 rates). In 1993, 
however, Rowe voted to cap the number of students it would accept and to increase tuition until, in 
1996, all Heath students would be paying full tuition (Maloney 1993; Valette 1993a). In response, 
Heath built an elementary school that was scheduled to open in September of 1996 (Raybuck 1995). 
Rowe voted not to allow Rowe students to pay tuition to attend the Heath school, but instead to open 
the Rowe school to students from other communities under the state's "school choice" law (Raybuck 
1993; Valette 1995). It is questionable whether Rowe's decision to cap enrollment from Heath while 
opening enrollment to other communities, with an unofficial cap on the number of tuitioned students at 
no more than the number of Rowe students (Raybuck 1995), is financially sound.  
With the dust yet to settle, it was clear in 1994 that Rowe and all the surrounding communities had to 
make dramatic changes in their municipal operations. Rowe had not yet reassessed its properties for 
tax purposes, but the consensus was that they would have depreciated in value. Heath had undergone 
reappraisal; local assessors estimated a six-million-dollar decline in property values, with the closing of 
YAEC as the major reason. Rowe had raised property taxes from $4.86 per thousand of assessed 
value in 1993 to $5.50 per thousand for 1996 (Metzbach 1996). Heath had raised its tax rates from 
$16.43 per thousand in 1993 to $20.04 in 1994 (Maloney 1993). Monroe was expected to request a 
bailout from the Commonwealth.  
The antinuclear activists had not gone away, but continued to question YAEC about each phase of the 
decommissioning process. They voiced two major concerns. First, they believed that the YAEC 
process for removing all radioactive material was improperly rushed (Chandler 1995). For example, the 
company's transport of two generators from the plant to Barnwell, viewed in a citation earlier in this 
paper as a funeral procession, was accompanied by activists who labeled the train a "train of death" 
(Davis 1992; Feinstein 1993).  
Second, the plant's critics pursued the issue of medical problems in the area. There were 
unsubstantiated reports of abnormally high county rates ($0 percent above the national average) of 
four types of cancer, and of an extremely high number (700 percent of the norm) of children born with 
Downs Syndrome. The local representative in the state legislature had called for an exhaustive health 
study of area residents and plant workers, to be funded as part of decommissioning costs (Davis 
1993a; Parker 1993; Howe 1997). Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), an environmental watchdog 
group, appealed to the NRC for public hearings on the levels of worker and public radiation exposure 
during decommissioning. Yankee Rowe officials said the levels were well below limits (Davis 1996b), 
but CAN members contend that the study's calculations were flawed (Burton 1996). Activists have filed 
complaints with the NRC about the lack of public hearings on Yankee Rowe's decommissioning and 
on the levels of worker radiation exposure during deconstruction and the transportation of radioactive 
waste (Decommissioning Halted at Rowe 1995; Gordon 1996). In short, as YAEC closed the plant, it 
continued to be scrutinized.  
The decommissioning process did continue to provide jobs. Through the year 2003 the $368.8 million 
project will employ up to 300 contractors or YAEC employees (Gordon 1995). Some are local and 
almost all will spend money locally, so the economic decline is likely to be a gradual process. 
Ironically, since YAEC is the first of many plants to go through the formal decommissioning process, 
the NRC has invited scientists and researchers from all over the world to study the aged reactor, and 
the visitors are contributing to the local economy (Moriarty 1993; Davis 1993b).  
To summarize: closing the nuclear plant has affected all the residents of the area: where they work, 
the civic services they use, the charities they turn to and the businesses where they spend their money 
all changed. The basic economic effect of the closing will ultimately be the loss of 260 permanent jobs 
and of a payroll greater than $12.5 million. Our calculation of the employment and personal income 
multipliers shows that the local economy will eventually have lost the means of producing 225 
additional jobs and $9,950,073 in additional personal income. In the total context of the local economy, 
this is not a devastating loss. However, jobs at similar wages with similar multipliers are not likely to 
come to the county. In other words, the county has lost a "flagship" company: YAEC had provided 
unusually well-paid white- and blue-collar jobs for its region. Residents will now have to settle for less.  
Finally, there is the long-term effect of the plant's skeleton.[ 3] Although the area of the plant will be 
reconfigured to its pre-1958 state: a beautiful field at the edge of a crystal lake (illustration 4; compare 
with illustration 1), that will not occur until well into the next century. About sixty percent of the 
dismantling has occurred to date (Davis 1996a). However, its completion depends on plans being 
approved for interim and permanent storage facilities for high-level radioactive waste-an issue that has 
been mired in controversy at the federal level. A federal appeals court ruled in July 1996 that the 
government must live up to the 1982 law that set January 31, 1998 as the date to begin disposal of the 
nuclear industry's spent fuel (Court Rules Against Government 1996). Current projections for 
acceptance dates at possible storage facilities range from 2002-2004 for an interim site on the 
Mescalero Apache Reservation, New Mexico (Tribe Agrees to Store Radioactive Wastes 1995), to 
2010-2015 for the Yucca Mountain permanent repository (Court Rules Against Government 1996; 
Whipple 1996). Projections for the shipment date of Yankee Rowe's 533 radioactive, spent fuel 
assemblies range from the promised 1998 to the Energy Department's schedule of 2033 (Chandler 
1995). In the interim, the company will have to build a storage facility and keep its spent radioactive 
fuel assemblies on site. This situation may keep the site in a "nuclear condition" for years to come. In 
the meantime, Rowe will be a town with an eroding tax base, a nuclear plant that is being ripped apart, 
and possibly a depository of radioactive rods.  
Implications of the Case Study  
The YAEC case study brings to light concerns that may have national significance for communities 
where nuclear power plants are closed. The first concern is whether closing a nuclear power plant is 
any different from closing a simple factory or a military base. Our opinion is that there is a major 
difference. As discussed in the theoretical review section on the political dynamics of plant closings, 
the magnitude of the scale, expense, and time for nuclear decommissioning far exceeds that for 
industrial plant closings. The conditions that necessitate the closing and the remedial action needed 
thereafter are very different for nuclear and for manufacturing plants. Furthermore, a nuclear plant's 
decommissioning process is long: in the case of YAEC, it will take at least ten years. In contrast, for 
example, the Digital Equipment Corporation closed several plants in less than a year, and Fort 
Devens, New England's largest military post, was vacated in less than three years. In both cases, new 
uses were being proposed and explored well before the facilities had been emptied.  
The second concern is the fact that adaptive re-use for a decommissioned nuclear plant is uniquely 
problematic. What organization would be willing to take on the risk of revitalization and the concomitant 
liability for the plant's and the site's health consequences in the region? In the short-to-moderate time 
frame, economic re-uses for the site are virtually impossible. The problem can be compared in 
principle, though not in scale, to the impediments to re-use of contaminated Superfund industrial sites. 
Some antinuclear activists have proposed that the Rowe facility be left intact for decades to come, to 
permit the core's radioactivity to decline. Others have proposed that the site be restored to the pristine 
natural area that existed before the nuclear plant was built (Holdsmith 1991). The second option 
seems the most feasible.[ 4]  
The third concern is the prevailing negative attitudes and stigma associated with the site of a nuclear 
power facility, as with other unwanted uses. As discussed in the theoretical section on attitude 
formation, peoples' perceptions of certain unwanted uses influence the siting, presence, and 
operations of certain facilities and their closing as well. Do these perceptions subside once the facility 
is closed? Is the stigma magnified because the facility was forced to close, raising the possibility of the 
closing signifying the failure of a plant that was suspect to begin with? It is uncertain whether the town 
of Rowe will carry a stigma that makes it impossible to attract new investment. Franklin County is 
already losing jobs and becoming a home of commuters. In fact, the county already has tens of acres 
of open land zoned for industry and hundreds of thousands of square feet of vacant mill space. Given 
the isolation of Rowe and the fact that better sites are available for economic uses, the chances of 
Rowe attracting development there under any rational circumstances are slim. Conversations with 
local realtors suggest that there is every likelihood that residential property values will continue to fall 
during the decommissioning, because of the lack of jobs as well as the plant being dismantled. While 
they do not believe that the community will have the stigma attached, for example, to Love Canal 
through environmental disaster, realtors do not believe that the vicinity of a decommissioned nuclear 
plant is a positive selling point, particularly if radioactive rods are stored there.  
A fourth issue is what obligation of the owners arises from decommissioning the facility. As noted 
previously, the process is not expected to be completed until at least 2004. In the meantime, it is 
expected that the value of the site will decline, housing values will fall, and the tax base will erode. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of attracting new investment is virtually nil. Given these circumstances, it 
would appear that aid from some source is in order. But which should it be? YAEC could argue 
rationally that the company is no different from any other business and that market conditions dictate 
the profitability of the site. They could also argue that they have paid their share of taxes for the past 
forty years and that the property is theirs to do as they wish with, within the limits of law. Yet, if we 
accept the assumptions that the effects of decommissioning are so comprehensive and will last so 
long, such YAEC arguments can be countered by pointing out that through decommissioning, the 
company is hindering the possibility of the community's recovery. It therefore may have the same 
obligation to help as any company that has, for example, created a Superfund site. Nonetheless, there 
are no legal requirements for the company to help the community. YAEC is now acting well within the 
legal guidelines for its responsibilities to the community; its ethical stance is the same as that adopted 
by most large companies that are downsizing. We fear that these guidelines and positions are too 
meager.  
Finally, a major concern when examining this case history is the role of the municipal and regional 
planners. The town of Rowe has no professional planner, and the county has a staff of five for a 26-
town area. That staff is overwhelmingly oriented toward transportation and environmental issues. In 
fact, only one of the five planners provides technical assistance to communities. The former county 
planner had been strongly opposed to the operating and then the decommissioning of YAEC. Her view 
was that the county would benefit more if the facility closed sooner. At public hearings and through 
contributions to environmental impact review hearings, she regularly questioned company practices. 
Yet, once YAEC closed, no vision or plan was in place for dealing with the site. No thought had been 
given to the question of tomorrow. Even today, five years after the closing was announced, there is still 
no post-YAEC plan in place. The county planners have concentrated on ensuring that the region's 
public health, its safety, and the environment are protected as the decommissioning process 
continues. The longer view is more complex and will depend on decisions made by the NRC (the plant 
regulators), the company (the land owners) and the town (in town by-laws). Above all, what ensues will 
depend upon how well the site is cleansed of any nuclear residue, and whether the liability of future 
owners can be limited. It is only in the last year that the community and county planners have begun a 
post-Yankee Rowe plan. In the summer of 1996, county planners surveyed one hundred townspeople 
on issues surrounding Yankee Rowe's closing and the town of Rowe (Taylor and Quinn 1996; Quinn 
1996).  
What do we expect to happen? Our opinion is that Rowe and other communities with closing nuclear 
facilities will continue to decline. They are scattered and located mostly in remote areas with small 
populations; thus the scale of their problem in aggregate is minute as compared to the problems of 
inner cities or of military base closings. Finally, this is really a problem that no one owns: according to 
current arrangements it is neither the company's nor the federal government's. The communities will 
be lost in the shuffle.  
Key Issues Evaluated  
There is a strong similarity between companies' short-term activities as described in the literature on 
other plant closing cases and YAEC's short-term activities-typically, outplacement and job retraining 
programs. However, with regard to the long-term effects of plant closings, dissimilarities between 
previous findings and what is emerging at the YAEC site are apparent.  
YAEC's Responsibilities  
Peter Drucker and Malcolm Baldridge, among others, have strongly promoted the concept that 
management is responsible for its effect on employees and the community (Carroll 1987). How, then, 
is Yankee performing? With cold correctness. It informed the workers and the community as soon as 
the decision to close had been made, provided an extraordinary benefits package, and kept on as 
many employees as it could, as long as it could. From the time of the announcement of the closing to 
when this paper was written, layoffs and separations had occurred far more by attrition than by direct 
firings. At the same time, the company steadily divested itself of community involvements. It 
contributed less to local charities, asked for tax abatements, and asked to no longer be responsible for 
the early warning system; and it moved as rapidly as possible to fully decommission the plant. YAEC 
was not ignoring its responsibilities, but was merely living up to its obligations. Clearly, the company 
could have been doing more. After all, it would be in the community for at least another decade, and 
the stakes were the long-term economic health of the community and its county. On the other hand, as 
a profit-making company it had a responsibility to provide the maximum return on investment to its 
stockholders.[ 5]  
If there is a problem here, it may be that Yankee had been too closely intertwined with its nearby 
communities. As Drucker (1974) has written, "The fewer impacts an institution has outside of its 
specific purpose and mission, the better does it conduct itself, the more responsibly does it act and the 
more acceptable a citizen, neighbor and contributor it is." The company did not have to "buy local," did 
not have to contribute to community needs, and did not have to have a policy of encouraging its 
employees to participate in local government. However, it did choose those policies, with the result that 
it was totally enmeshed in the lives of these communities. Extracting the company from its 
involvement, whether with financial commitments or human ones, would not be easy.  
Is this a case, then, of ignoring the social contract and the payment of a social wage to the YAEC 
employees? After all, Yankee was closing because of slack demand and the high cost of 
reconstruction, so we think not. This has not been a case when the company has requested employee 
give-backs or threatened that unless even greater efficiencies were achieved they would lose their jobs 
to another plant. Nor is it a question of a union wage versus a nonunion wage. The entire Yankee 
system is unionized. Further, the company continues to enjoy a begrudging respect from its union 
employees. If anything, the union members were angry at the antinuclear activists and the media, not 
the company. In sum, the company wanted to stay in Rowe just as much as the unions wanted it to.  
Future Prospects for Dismissed Employees  
What will happen to the Yankee Rowe employees? Over the short term, some will continue to work at 
the plant while it is decommissioned. Part of the whitecollar force will be absorbed into the parent 
company. Over time, however, all of the work force in Rowe will be dismissed. If they stay in the area 
they will almost certainly, as Bluestone and Harrison (1982) have noted about other plant closings, 
suffer a loss of pay and status. There are simply no jobs in Rowe that match their skills, nor any local 
plants where pride of work is so high. Further, the region, at present, is suffering from an 
unemployment rate of approximately five percent. Some new employment growth is expected, but 
these jobs will either require a strong scientific background or be in the low-paying service sector. The 
options, as in many other areas of the nation, are: move, or accept a job at less pay and a loss of 
status.  
What is especially different at Rowe, however, is the degree of alienation likely for those who stay. 
Rowe and its neighboring communities were dominated by YAEC, and most employees seemed to 
think the plant would last forever. From this lofty situation to "just a job" is a real comedown. The 
decline in status will be particularly difficult because for years the Yankee employees often were 
regarded with some jealousy. Furthermore, it was the company that made the civic contributions and 
encouraged its employees to participate in community life. Now, each former employee has been left 
to his/her own devices; there is no other "enlightened" company quite like YAEC in the region. Thus, 
we expect that the transition for the YAEC employees will be difficult.  
For two years the town and the county were quiet about the decline of the area, simply knowing that 
the plant had closed and that decommissioning was occurring. In early 1994, however, the county 
planners began to prepare economic stimulus plans for all of the communities affected by the plant 
closing. This step, the first of many to come, was intended to provide grants and tax incentives to 
attract new investment to the area. The state was giving little attention to the future of the plant. The 
company's plans called for restoring the area to its condition before the plant was built. Interestingly, 
Rowe will then have a second "ghost" area added to the abandoned nineteenth-century Davis Village, 
whose 150 structures were ultimately demolished (Federal Writers Project 1983). Might there be a 
third?  
The Possibilities in Regulatory Action  
Would comprehensive plant-closing legislation have influenced YAEC's decision? Probably, yes. A 
look at federal and state plant-closing legislation shows that the laws, at least in part, are intended to 
slow capital flight, require companies to help employees and host communities, and promote 
reinvestment at the existing site (Perucci et al. 1988). In YAEC's case the capital flight was due not to 
company practices but to new and stricter federal safety standards. Moreover, the state government 
gave the idea of keeping an aged nuclear power plant, at best, a mixed reaction. Many governmental 
officials viewed the good of the Commonwealth in terms of safety as offsetting the pain to the region 
and the company. Thus government did not clamor to stop this capital flight.  
Economic Restructuring Exemplified  
Where does this case fit in terms of the concept of economic restructuring? Beauregard, among 
others, has stated that economic restructuring must be positioned along functional, temporal, and 
structural aspects. The functional aspect consists of the mix of goods and services that are produced 
within the economy; the temporal aspect concerns whether the changes are part of a discontinuity, or 
of a gradual shift in the economy; and the structural element refers to the order of social, economic, 
and political life (Beauregard 1989). All three aspects appear in the case of YAEC. From the functional 
aspect, the mix of goods and services is changing, with less overall demand for energy alternative 
"goods" available at a lower price. From the temporal aspect, the YAEC case exemplifies the concepts 
of both discontinuity and gradualism as defined by the Fainsteins (1989). It represents a discontinuity 
in the sense that it is the first "on-line" nuclear plant to close as a result of capital flight. On the other 
hand, the YAEC closing marks the beginning of a slow process that we expect will ultimately include 
the closing of all of our nuclear facilities. In short, this case is a straightforward example of the key 
elements of economic restructuring at work.  
Planners' Role  
What is the role of the local planner in coping with the future of nuclear plants? There are no easy 
answers. However, four basic strategies appear to have merit. 1) Local and regional planners from 
areas where nuclear plants are located should form an alliance to bring their concerns to the NRC and 
to the industry itself. The merit of such an approach would be to establish working protocols involving 
all three players. The procedures established for the planning process for closing military bases could 
serve as a model. It is our opinion that without a consolidated effort by the local communities, the 
power companies, and the regulators, the decommissioning process will be developed incrementally, 
influenced largely by vocal, special interest groups. Furthermore, if the power companies work on their 
own without coherent community input, they will be less likely to contribute more than the minimums 
required by law when closings occur.  
• 2) Localities should establish task forces well ahead of the expected closing. Such a task 
force, consisting of government officials, citizens, and company representatives, would have a 
mandate to prepare a contingency decommissioning plan. Arguing over the failure of the plant 
at a public hearing is often futile, as legalistic rules preclude compromise. But working 
arrangements with the owners that are reached outside the legal arena can produce plans 
that are mutually beneficial. We are not being naive here. We realize that often there are deep 
divisions between a community and a company that may never be mended outside of court. 
However, many issues can be worked out in an amiable way if company representatives are 
carefully included in the local planning process.  
• 3) Planners should draw on the experiences of other communities. There are now a significant 
number of communities where plants have closed. Examining how they have reacted could be 
valuable for planning in communities awaiting closure. One way to achieve this might be to 
establish a clearing house for information on the successful efforts by which individual 
communities have achieved revitalization after plant closings. The National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, the Department of Defense, and the International City Managers Association 
frequently offer "success stories" to communities that are recovering from problems caused by 
major change. Unfortunately, no such clearing house exists to help communities facing 
nuclear plant closings.  
Finally, planners must bring the case for planning assistance to the attention of their state political 
officials. When, for decades, nuclear plants have served as the major suppliers of the state's energy 
and have been located in the midst of other commercial and industrial uses, a strong case exists for 
state planning assistance. A combination of community, company, and state assistance is in order.  
A Closing Statement  
Whether through lack of faith in technology, anxiety about waste disposal, resistance to rate increases, 
fear of socioeconomic change, recognition of risks to health and safety, worry about land use impacts, 
objections to various inequities, or some combination of these reservations, the public will someday 
reshape decommissioning policy. In anticipation, a research program should examine these issues, at 
least in those communities where power plants are earmarked for the first wave of commercial 
decommissioning. Such studies will not only provide the empirical data needed to assist decision 
making, but will help to include a broader segment of the population in decisions about 
decommissioning policy.  
NOTES  
1. This interpretation is based on a series of interviews in fall 1993, between researchers at the 
University of Massachusetts Center for Economic Development and local citizens and public officials 
(Maloney 1993). Also see Roche 1991c; Coakley and Roche 1988.  
2. The data and the analysis of Yankee (Rowe)'s economic ties to the community in this section were 
taken from a report the authors prepared for YAEC in 1991 (Center for Economic Development 1991).  
3. For a discussion of the range of decommissioning options, see Surrey 1992.  
4. There is a touch of irony here: Even if restored to its natural beauty, the site will still fall within what 
Jakle and Wilson (1992) have defined as the "fifth order of dereliction."  
5. In many ways, YAEC's behavior matches that of the industrial corporations in Southwestern 
Pennsylvania as described by Roger Ahlbrandt (1991).  
TABLE 1. YAEC's contribution to Western Massachusetts  
Source                                                    Amount 
 
YAEC Payroll                                         $12,580,687 
 
Goods, Services and Municipal Costs in 
Western Massachusetts                                $ 3,847,906 
 
Civic/Public Service Contributions in 
Western Massachusetts                                   $ 17,295 
 
Municipal Taxes and Contributions                      $ 710,216 
Source: University of Massachusetts, Center for Economic Development (1991)  
TABLE 2. YAEC employment and personal income multipliers for every million dollars of 
electricity produced  
Multiplier Type      Direct      Indirect      Induced     Total 
 
Employment           4.8735       1.7607        2.4975    9.1317 
 
Personal Income 
(million $s)         0.1329       0.0303        0.0305    0.1936 
Source: University of Massachusetts, Center for Economic Development (1991)  
MAP: MAP 1. The location of the YAEC nuclear power plant, Yankee Rowe. YAEC is located eleven 
miles north of State Route 2 and five miles south of the Vermont line. The nearest large community is 
Greenfield, the county seat, 27 miles east of the plant.  
PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): ILLUSTRATION 1. The YAEC nuclear power plant. Source: Yankee 
Atomic  
PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): ILLUSTRATION 2. Pleasant Dreams--a cartoon representative of the 
opposition to the NRC's renewing Yankee Rowe's operating license. Source: Valley Comics  
PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): ILLUSTRATION 3. The departure of a YAEC nuclear generator. The 
transportation of this generator, with lights blinking and klaxons piercing the hills, resembled a funeral 
procession marking the end of the YAEC plant. Source: Yankee Atomic  
PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): ILLUSTRATION 4. The future site of YAEC, in a simulation. Source: 
Yankee Atomic  
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